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1. Introduction 
 
The increasing popularity of televised sports events in the U.S. and Europe has had significant 
effects on the broadcasting sectors and sports leagues on both sides of the Atlantic. As a 
result, competition authorities have shown considerable interest in the evolution of sports 
broadcast rights on both continents. In the U.S., attention has been focused on professional 
and amateur (intercollegiate) leagues alike, while in Europe most attention has been given to 
the relationship between broadcasting and various countries’ professional soccer leagues. 
The recent attempt by the UK’s leading pay-television operator, BSkyB, to purchase the 
leading soccer club, Manchester United, has changed the tone if not the substance of 
broadcast sports rights negotiations in the UK and, perhaps, throughout Europe.  
 
This paper focuses upon the competition and efficiency issues involved in the granting of 
broadcast rights by sports teams or leagues and their resolution on both sides of the Atlantic. 
What are the consequences of collective (and exclusive) selling by sports leagues of their 
                     
* Cave is grateful for helpful comments to Campbell Cowie and Stefan Szymanski. 
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broadcast rights?  Does the control of sports broadcast rights allow the broadcaster to 
leverage its position and increase its monopoly power? Can leagues foreclose entry by 
competitors through widespread sale of broadcast rights to local or national broadcasters? 
Can ownership of sports teams by broadcasters have anti-competitive effects? Although we 
do not offer any new insights on these well-researched theoretical issues, we provide evidence 
to suggest that such problems are much less acute in the United States than in Europe. 
 
We begin with a discussion of the evolution of sports leagues in the U.S. and Europe. We then 
turn to the changing structure of broadcasting on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
Finally, we analyse the changes in the structure of sports broadcast rights and their likely effect 
on league balance, league monopoly power, and market power in broadcasting. 
 
2 The Sports Marketplace  
 
Sports in the United States 
 
The United States has a much more diverse set of sports leagues available for broadcasting 
than any other part of the world. There are major professional sports leagues for baseball, 
football, basketball and hockey which have been in existence for decades and which have 
lucrative broadcasting contracts with various commercial broadcast networks, local broadcast 
stations, direct broadcast satellite services, and cable networks.  In addition, college 
basketball, college football, professional soccer, professional golf, professional tennis, and 
automobile racing enjoy wide broadcast exposure. 
 
The bargaining power of the seller of sports broadcast rights depends in part on the number of 
alternative sources of such programming that are available. In the United States, each of the 
major professional sports is organized as a single league. The National Football League 
(NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the 
National Hockey League (NHL) currently have no professional competitors in their respective 
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sports. These dominant positions have existed for at least two decades. Although entry by new 
leagues had been quite common in earlier decades, only one new league has been formed in 
the past twenty years. 
 
Major League Baseball has been immune from serious competitive entry threats since World 
War I. The other professional sports leagues—basketball, football, and hockey—had 
substantial new competition in the 1960s and 1970s before the liberalization of U.S. 
broadcast-cable policy, but none since then. The American Basketball Association was 
formed in 1967 and lasted until 1976 when it began to fail as three of its nine teams 
suspended operations. A fourth team failed at the end of the season, and four of the remaining 
teams were simply absorbed into the incumbent NBA league. A rival football league, the 
American Football League, was formed to challenge the NFL in 1960, but it reached a merger 
agreement with the NFL in 1966 and was fully absorbed into the NFL by 1970. Two 
subsequent entrants, the World Football League (1974-75) and the USFL (1983-85), were 
much less serious competitive threats to the NFL, and both quietly folded without any of their 
teams being absorbed by the NFL. Finally, in hockey, the World Hockey League, mounted a 
serious challenge to the NHL in 1972-79, but it finally succumbed with only four o f its remaining 
seven teams being absorbed by the NHL.    
 
The apparent reasons for this recent lack of entry are (i) the continual expansion of the 
incumbent leagues, (ii) the evolution of players’ negotiating power over salaries, and (iii) the 
pre-emption of broadcast opportunities through expansion of television coverage by the 
incumbent leagues. We deal with the first two of these briefly in this section, leaving the 
discussion of broadcast coverage to a later section.1 
 
First, the United States has witnessed substantial population growth and western expansion. 
Had the major sports leagues failed to expand from their original limited eastern and 
                     
 
1 There are numerous sources of information on each of these topics. See, for example, Quirk and Fort (1992); Scully (1995); and Sheehan (1996).  
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midwestern locations, new leagues would surely have exploited this failure. Baseball was the 
first to move west and to expand. Between 1903 and 1950, there was no change in the identity 
of MLB’s teams. The southern and western limits of baseball were defined by two of the 
league’s 16 teams that were located in St. Louis. Beginning in 1958, however, major-league 
baseball shifted strongly westward and southward.  Today, baseball has 30 teams,  15 of 
which are as south or west of St. Louis. In most of the new cities, local and state tax monies 
have been mobilized to pay for stadiums that are leased exclusively to MLB teams during 
baseball season. Thus, the ability of a new league to exploit new geographic markets has 
been substantially preempted.2 Similarly, football, hockey and basketball have expanded 
dramatically since 1960, with hockey’s expansion being the most dramatic. In 1960, the NHL 
had but six teams, four of which were in the U.S.; today, the NHL is comprised of 27 teams. 
(See Table 1.) 
 
Most large metropolitan areas in the U.S. are now blanketed with a baseball, football, hockey, 
and basketball teams. Hockey, a winter sport, is available in the Arizona desert.  
 
Table 1 
The Expansion of U.S. Sports Leagues, 1960-99 
 
League 
 
Number of Teams, 1960 
 
Number of Teams, 1999 
 
Major League Baseball 
 
16 
 
30 
 
National Football League 
 
13 
 
31 
 
National Basketball Assn. 
 
8 
 
29 
                     
2 It is not surprising that discussions of a new league in North America generally involve consideration of entry opportunities in Mexico. 
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National Hockey League 
 
6 
 
27 
 
Basketball, a sport most popular in U.S. inner cities, is even available on the west coast of 
Canada. Much of this geographical expansion has clearly been motivated by the desire to pre-
empt entry or to absorb teams from the new leagues which formed in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Had basketball, football, and hockey expanded sooner, they may have foreclosed even these 
entry attempts.  
 
Second, a protracted set of legal battles has substantially liberalized the player market, 
allowing players in each league to achieve “free-agent” status after a number of years. The 
result has been a remarkable escalation of player salaries. According to Quirk and Fort 
(1992), average real baseball and professional basketball salaries rose nine-fold between 
1960 and 1991 while real football salaries increased by nearly 400 percent over the same 
period. In earlier years, there were numerous player legal challenges to the monopsony power 
of their teams under league rules.3 Until these rules were changed through the institution of 
player free agency, players could be lured to a new league when dissatisfied. In the past two 
decades, however, most of the successful, star players have been accommodated to a degree 
that makes new leagues less attractive to them. 
 
Free agency may not eliminate the monopoly profits from owning a franchise, but it certainly 
reduces them somewhat, thereby making competitive entry less attractive. Free agency also 
lowers the probability of competitive entry by reducing the incentives for the most important 
“star” players to shift to a new league. Without these star players, a new league’s prospects for 
survival are dramatically reduced. 
 
 
                     
3 The most important of these was Flood v Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), a suit brought by Curt Flood, a star player, against MLB, 
challenging baseball's "reserve" clause that limited players' rights to choose their team and, therefore, to shop for competitive salaries. Similar challenges 
were mounted by Oscar Robertson against the NBA and John Mackey against the NFL. 
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Of equal importance, however, has been the ability of the U.S. professional sports leagues to 
adapt to increasing numbers of broadcast outlets by expanding the scope of their broadcast 
coverage. This has occurred both across the domain of off-air networks and cable networks.  
We return to this phenomenon below. 
 
European Soccer. 
 
The population of Europe exhibits differentiated tastes for participating in sports and watching 
them either as spectators or viewers.  In the larger countries professional soccer stands out as 
the most commercialised sport with the most valuable rights, and the discussion below 
focuses upon it.4 
 
Professional sports leagues in Europe, such as the English Football League, have been under 
the control of governing bodies which also administer amateur activities.  Sports leagues have 
traditionally been organised on a hierarchical basis, with promotion and relegation between 
upper and lower divisions at the end of each season. An entrepreneur or firm can thus enter 
the business by acquiring an existing club and – if necessary –  investing in promotion, rather 
than by acquiring new franchises.  These arrangements make the creation de novo of a 
competing league at the national level less likely than in the U.S. 
 
Increasing revenues for soccer clubs, many of them derived from broadcasting rights, have, 
however, encouraged the leading clubs in the UK to seek greater independence within the 
national association. UK teams had played in a Football League, which has operated under 
the auspices of the Football Association (F.A.) since 1888.  Clubs were normally limited 
companies, closely held by a small number of shareholders.  The League imposed a 
maximum wage on players until 1961.   
 
                     
4  Formula 1 motor racing is another highly commercialised sport and in 2000 the European Commission was continuing an enquiry 
into how its television rights were sold. 
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In 1992, clubs in the first division of the Football League agreed to form a new competition, the 
Premier League, directly under the control of the F.A.  This enabled them to escape from the 
majority control of the smaller clubs in the League, and in particular to control directly the sale 
of broadcast rights and the distribution of associated revenues.  Seven years following the 
formation of the Premier League, 10 of 20 Premier League clubs have floated on the stock 
market. 
 
UK Premier League soccer clubs enjoyed an increase in turnover between 1991/2 and 1997/8 
of 250 percent, making the Premier League the largest in Europe, with an income in 1997/8 
three times that of the French league and 42 percent  greater than that of  Serie A in Italy.  
(Deloitte and Touche 1999, p 62).  The revenues and  wage bills of the leading clubs in each of 
5 countries are shown in Table 2.  The UK clubs’ income comes from broadcast revenue 
(27%), match-day revenue (36%) and commercial and other revenue (37%). 
 
Table 2 
Financial Data of Leading European Clubs 
 
Country Club Year Revenue 
($m) 
Wage Bill 
($m) 
England Manchester 
United 
1997 139.4 35.8 
France 
Paris St. 
Germain 
1996 45.0 19.2 
Germany Bayer 
München 
n/a 90.4 20.8 
Italy Juventus 1997 82.3 46.2 
Spain Barcelona 1996 65.5 27.8 
Source:  Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) p 209 
 
If the formation of the Premier League was driven by the desire of the top clubs to avoid 
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sharing power and broadcasting revenues with inferior clubs, the proposal in 1998 to establish 
a separate Super League outside the existing framework of competitions involving a fixed 
group of the best European clubs would have had greater repercussions.  Hoehn and 
Szymanski (1999) argue, however, that such a trend is inevitable, as participation by some 
clubs in supra-national competitions both widens the dispersion of national clubs’ earnings 
and reduces the incentive to redistribute income in order to maintain competitive balance at 
the national level.  A closed Super League is thus the economic equilibrium. 
 
3. The Television Marketplace 
 
The Structure of the U.S. Video Market 
 
For more than thirty years, the U.S. television industry was highly concentrated as a result of 
the explicit spectrum-allocation and cable-television policies of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC). The FCC protected a stable three-network off-air oligopoly from various 
sources of competition on the dubious premise that such protection would encourage entry 
into the upper UHF band. By the late 1970s, this policy had been exposed as futile, and the 
Commission—prodded by the courts—responded by easing rules on cable television signal 
carriage. As a result, cable subscriptions trebled between 1980 and 1990. The 1990s 
witnessed new entry into direct-to-home (DTH) satellite broadcasting with the development of 
high-powered satellites and small household receiving dishes. The result of this expansion of 
cable television and DTH satellite service has been a much more competitive U.S. 
multichannel video program distribution (MVPD) market. 
 
Until the late 1970s, three commercial networks dominated programming decisions during 
prime viewing hours, including those involving national sports rights, because of the FCC’s 
policy.5 Competition for local broadcast rights might be more intensive in the few markets that 
had 4 or more commercial VHF stations, but there were only three bidders for national 
                     
5 See Owen and Wildman (1992) for a discussion of FCC broadcast policy. 
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programming, including sports. 
 
National broadcasts of sports leagues were relatively limited prior to 1962. Major league 
Baseball had a  “game of the week”  national contract, and the new football entrant, the AFL, 
had a $2 million per-year contract with ABC in 1960-65, but the NFL had been barred by a 
federal antitrust case from pooling its television broadcast rights into a single national contract. 
In 1961, however, the Congress passed the Sports Broadcasting Act, which essentially 
reversed this court decision and allowed league-wide sales of national broadcast rights. The 
result was a dramatic increase in the value of national network television sports rights 
throughout the 1960s as a network  triopoly bid aggressively for the right to broadcast NFL 
games, and—more modestly—the rights to other professional league broadcasts. (See 
Figure 1.)  
 
The liberalization of cable television in 1977-79 by court decisions and relaxed FCC 
regulation, combined with the new technology of high-powered direct-to-home satellite 
distribution, presented the first challenge to the national broadcast triopoly and the first 
opportunity for national sports leagues to benefit from increased competition for their 
Figure 1 
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  Source: Quirk and Fort (1992); Kagan (1998) 
   
broadcast rights. As Figure 2 shows, there was a modest jump in the real, inflation-adjusted 
value of national professional sports television rights in 1978, perhaps in response to this 
developing threat. It was not until 1982-87, however, that a new cable network –  
 
 
ESPN—actually secured broadcast rights to a major sports league’s games. The total value of 
sports rights thus increased once again in the 1982-85 period. 
 
The entry of a fourth off-air network, Fox, into the market for national sports rights boosted the 
value of these rights once again. In 1994, Fox outbid CBS for a portion of the NFL national 
contract, thereby escalating the competition to four national broadcast networks and the one 
large cable network. When the 1994-97 contracts expired, CBS re-entered the bidding, and 
the value of NFL broadcast rights essentially doubled. At about the same time, Fox also bid 
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away a large share of the national Major League Baseball contract from ABC, but the real 
value of baseball’s broadcast rights remained relatively stable. However, with cable networks 
in the bidding for NBA broadcast rights, the real value of NBA rights more than doubled in 
1997, a reflection of increased media competition and the rising popularity of professional 
basketball. 
 
  Source: Quirk and Fort (1992); Kagan (1998). 
 
In the past five years, another source of competition for broadcasters and cable networks has 
emerged in the form of high-powered direct broadcast satellite – “direct to home”—satellite 
broadcasting. DirecTV entered with a new high-powered service in 1993 and EchoStar (DISH 
Network) followed in 1996. These two companies have slowly built their subscriber bases to 
6.5 million and 3.5 million, respectively, but their growth has been hampered by regulations 
and copyright provisions that limit their ability to retransmit local broadcast signals in areas 
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where subscribers can receive these broadcasts off air. Nevertheless, DirecTV is a 
particularly important bidder for national sports rights, and has succeeded in obtaining the 
national rights to NFL, MLB, NHL, and NBA games. DISH’s sports programming is more 
limited, confined largely to an offering of 22 regional cable networks, a golf channel, and the 
English Premier League. 
 
Television Markets in the UK 
 
Television programming is now delivered in the UK on terrestrial, satellite and cable platforms. 
 Free-to-air services are transmitted in both digital and analogue form by the BBC (funded by 
a licence fee) and three advertiser-supported channels.In late 1999 2.3 million  subscribers 
received satellite pay-TV services in analogue form from BSkyB, and 1.3 million in digital form. 
 (The company intends to transfer all its analogue subscribers to digital by 2001.)  In addition 
3.1 million households received pay television services in analogue form on cable, which is 
now dominated by two providers. A roll-out of digital cable services began in late 1999 in 
some areas.  Digital terrestrial transmission (DTT) pay services attracted 0.4 million 
subscribers. (Competition Commission 2000, p 73). 
 
Pay TV channels comprise basic channels (normally bought in bundled form and representing 
a channel by channel unraveling of the threads found in free to air services, such as news, 
comedy, travel, general entertainment, etc.) and premium channels – sports and movies – 
available on an à la carte  basis to households subscribing to a basic package.  In addition to 
sports programming available on free-to-air television, pay TV subscribers can generally 
purchase a sports channel (Eurosport) as part of a basic package and up to three premium 
sports channels (Sky Sports 1 – 3). 
 
Audience shares of the five main free-to-air channels and of pay TV services are shown in 
Table 3, both for all households and for cable and satellite TV households 
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Table 3 
Share of Viewing by Channel(Second Quarter 1999) 
 
 All Homes Satellite TV 
Homes 
BBC 1 & 2 39.7 27.3 
ITV 30.7 24.1 
C4 10.1 6.7 
C5 5.3 4.3 
Total  free-to-air 85.7 62.3 
Pay TV Channels of which -   14.4 37.7 
     Basic 11.0 28.9 
     Premium, of which 3.4 8.8 
          Sky Sports 1-3 1.8 4.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 Source: BARB 
 
While pay broadcasters have many sources of supply of basic channels, the supply at the 
wholesale level of premium sports and movie channels is dominated by BSkyB, which, as well 
as retailing them directly by satellite, supplies them to broadcasters using rival cable and DTT 
platforms.  These arrangements attracted the attention of the Office of Fair Trading, which in 
1996 investigated the price and other conditions of supply (OFT 1996). The Office concluded 
that BskyB’s method of selling its premium channels to its retail competitors had the potential 
to distort the behaviour of other Pay TV broadcasters, but it found no evidence of broader anti-
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competitive conduct.  BSkyB agreed to submit its wholesale rate cards for approval by the 
Office. 
 
One of the issues investigated by the OFT was the structure of BSkyB’s charges for premium 
channels at both retail and wholesale level.  A subscriber who purchased a basic package 
was then entitled to buy one premium channel at, say, £10 per month. A second could be 
bought for £6 per month, a third for £3 per month and so on.  This form of price discrimination, 
described as “deep discounting”, was recognised as having desirable efficiency properties 
compared with a flat rate structure, given the high fixed and zero marginal costs of providing a 
channel to a new subscriber.  Such pricing does, however, constitute a barrier to entry if one 
broadcaster gains a monopoly or dominant position in the supply of, say, premium sports 
programming for which there is no ready substitute..  In such circumstances, deep discounting 
 makes entry difficult for a firm seeking to supply premium movie channels, although the same 
problem would not apply to an entrant in pay-per-view movies.  In the event, the OFT did not 
find ‘deep discounting’ by BSkyB to be anti-competitive. 
 
Television Markets in Other European Countries 
 
The UK pattern of cable or wireless pay TV superimposed upon a strong free-to-air 
broadcasting system is replicated in other major European countries.  As in the UK the 
wholesale pay TV market is dominated by a single supplier, Canal Plus in France, Telepiu in 
Italy Canal Plus Espana in Spain and Premiere in Germany, although most of these are 
subject to some competition.  Table 4 summarises the situation for these countries and the 
UK. 
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Table 4 
Pay TV Channels in Five European Countries 
 
Country Delivery 
Platforms 
Main Competitors 
France 
 
Cable, Satellite Canal Plus, AB Sat, TPS 
Germany 
 
Cable, Satellite Premiere 
Italy 
 
Cable, Satellite Telepiu, Stream 
Spain 
 
Cable, Satellite Canal Plus, Espana,  
Via Digital 
UK 
 
Cable Satellite, 
Digital Terrestrial 
Sky, Cable Operatas 
On Digital 
  Source:  Cable and Satellite Europe:  various issues 
 
4. SPORTS RIGHTS – INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The United States 
 
The importance of broadcast revenues to the major U.S. professional sports leagues may be 
deduced from two recent estimates displayed in Table 5.  Professional football derives more 
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than half of its revenues from broadcasting; baseball and basketball about one-third; and 
hockey much less. The growth in the value of these rights over the past three decades has far 
outstripped the growth in U.S. economic activity. For example, in 1962 the National Football 
League signed its first national television contract that paid $4.7 million per year.6 By 1998, the 
NFL’s television contracts were yielding them $2.2 billion per year,7 reflecting a 17 percent 
nominal annual growth rate. Similar increases were registered by Major League Baseball. 
However, the greatest growth in national television revenues in recent years has been 
registered by the NBA, which actually surpassed baseball in 1995. ( See Figure 1.) 
 
Throughout the modern history of sports broadcasting in the U.S., there has always been 
controversy over the ability of leagues or sports associations to limit individual members’ 
rights to broadcast their games. A new law, the Sports Broadcasting Act, was required in 
1961 before sports leagues could offer their rights to national networks in a package. The 
1953 U.S. v NFL  case invalidated as violation of the Sherman Act a league-wide television 
contract that limited the ability of individual teams to broadcast their games into other teams’ 
home territories. Later, the same court ruled that a 1960 NFL contract that barred individual 
teams from selling their games to competing broadcasters was similarly a violation of the 
Sherman Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
6 Quirk and Fort (1992), p. 509. 
7 Kagan (1998). 
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Table 5 
Sports Broadcast Rights’ Share Total Revenues in U.S. Sports Leagues 
 1991 and 1997 
 
 
Sport 
 
1991 
Revenue 
Share 
 
1997Reve
nue Share 
 
Professional Football 
 
0.60 
 
0.56 
 
Major League Baseball 
 
0.50 
 
0.32 
 
Professional Basketball 
 
0.30 
 
0.39 
 
Hockey 
 
0.25 
 
0.09 
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Source: Financial World (1991) as quoted in Quirk and Fort (1992);Kagan (1998)  
 
With the passage of the 1961 Act, professional sports leagues were now free to enter into 
national television contracts that limited broadcasts into teams’ territories during the days in 
which the teams were playing home games. The NFL has had such contracts with national 
television networks since 1962 that essentially eliminate the teams’ own negotiations for local 
coverage. The revenues from these contracts have been spread evenly across all teams, 
thereby serving to ameliorate the financial disadvantages of teams in smaller geographical 
markets.8No other U.S. sports league relies solely on national rights, and none has as large a 
share of broadcast revenues in total revenues. 
 
The 1961 SBA does not legalize many other forms of restrictive agreements that may be 
sought by sports leagues in selling broadcast rights. In particular, the courts have invalidated a 
national broadcasting plan that was devised by the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) to control the telecasts of all member universities’ football games. This plan sharply 
limited the total number of football games that could be telecast, prohibiting individual teams 
and leagues from negotiating their own packages. The courts found that were no pro-
competitive justifications for such sweeping control of college football broadcasts, and it 
therefore sustained the rights of the two universities to break from the NCAA contracts with 
ABC and CBS by negotiating their own agreement with a rival network, NBC, in 1982.9  
 
In addition, individual teams may still have the ability to sell their broadcast rights even if the 
league has a national contract. League limitations on a team’s right to sell broadcasts of its 
games to local outlets, regional sports networks, or other broadcasters must be based on a 
compelling argument that such limitations are required to preserve competition within the 
league. For example,  nearly every basketball, hockey, and baseball team sells broadcast 
rights to local broadcasters and to regional sports networks. These broadcasts may be 
                     
8 This pooling of broadcast revenues does not eliminate the advantages of large-market teams in 
securing talent, and therefore it does not necessarily contribute to competitive balance.  
9 See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma & Univ. of Georgia Athletic Assn., Supreme Court of the United States, 468 U.S. 
85, 1984. 
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transmitted outside the team’s own territory and may even be viewed in a rival team’s market. 
The league may not limit such broadcasts without a sound argument that these broadcasts 
might undermine the ability of the offended teams to compete in the league. Thus, even sports 
teams in leagues with national network contracts may sell broadcast rights in games in which 
the league has no broadcast rights even though such games may dilute the value of the 
national contract.10 
 
The 1992 Cable Act requires cable companies with “attributable” interests in satellite-
delivered programming to make such programming available to other distribution technologies 
on comparable terms. While this provision of the law has been applied only to basic-cable 
networks thus far, it is quite likely that extensive media ownership of sports teams or leagues 
could lead to its application to sports programming as well. However, given the limited media 
ownership of sports teams thus far, such integration is not a major issue in the U.S. 
 
Europe 
 
UK broadcasters’ payments for sports rights are heavily skewed in favour of live soccer rights 
(see Table 6), and their value has grown over time.  (See Table 7).  Before 1964 Football 
League matches were not televised, either in live or highlight form.  A Saturday evening 
highlights program was then introduced. Live broadcasts began in 1983.  However, the two 
broadcasters in a position to bid for the rights (BBC and ITV) acted collusively (Szymanski & 
Kuypers 1999, pp 58-9).11 As a result, revenues from broadcast rights remained low until 
1992, when Sky Television, the fledgling satellite pay broadcaster, entered the market and 
won a substantial package of live rights for £37 million per year, bidding in conjunction with the 
BBC which maintained a highlights programme on free-to-air television.  When the rights were 
re-auctioned for 1997 – 2001, the annual payment went up fourfold (See Table 7).   
                     
10 See Chicago Profes sional Sports, Ltd. & WGN v. NBA, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 961 F. 2d 667, 1992. 
11 The fact that there was no formal investigation of the  duopoly illustrates the lack of interest shown by competition authorities in 
televised sport. 
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The dominant role of soccer rights in general and of Premier League rights in particular is 
shown by the fact that soccer rights in 1997/8 accounted for over three quarters of the annual 
expenditure on sports rights of BSkyB – the only supplier in the UK of a premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Value of Live Sports Rights in the U.K., 1999 
Sport Competition Broadcaster(s)  
F = free 
P = pay 
Duration 
(Yrs) 
Annual Charge 
(£m) 
Cricket Domestic Tests BSkyB (P) 
C4 (F) 
4 26 
Motorsport Formula 1 ITV (F) 5 12 
 
Rugby League Super League BSkyB (P) 5 11 
Rugby Union England 
Internationals 
BSkyB (P)– live 
 
5 18 
Snooker Embassy World 
Championship 
BBC (F) 4 10 
Soccer Premier League BSkyB (P) 4 167 
Soccer Champions League On Digital (P) 
ITV (F) 
3 87 
Tennis Wimbledon 
Championships  
BBC 4 7 
Source:  TV Sports Markets 
Table 7 
The Cost of the Rights to Live Soccer League Matches  
from the Top Division in England,1983 to 2001 
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 Start Date of Contract 
 1983 1985 1986 1988 1992 1997 
Length of contract (years) 2 0.5 2 4 5 4 
Broadcaster BBC/ITV BBC BBC/ITV ITV BSkyB BSkyB 
Rights fee (£m) 5.2 1.3 6.2 44 191.5 670 
Annual rights fee (£m) 2.6 2.6 3.1 11 38.3 167.5 
Number of live matches per season 10 6 14 18 60 60 
Fees per live match (£m) 0.26 0.43 0.22 0.61 0.64 2.79 
Source:  MMC (1999) para 4.131 
 
sports channel. The popularity of soccer in the UK is shown by the fact that of the most 100 
watched free-to-air sports broadcasts in 1998, 77  were of soccer.  In the case of pay TV, 96 
of 100 were soccer.12 
 
Televised soccer dominates sports programming in other major European countries as well, 
with similar effects on the value of rights. Thus the winning bids to broadcast the European 
Champions League from 1999-2002 were as high in France, Germany, Italy and Spain as in 
the UK.   Occasional sporting events, such as the Tour de France, attract audiences in each 
country, but viewing of soccer dominates. 
 
There are, however, differences among the five European countries in the manner in which 
rights for the top domestic leagues are sold.  In the UK a limited number of games are sold for 
live broadcast to a single broadcaster (which also makes them available to other platforms) on 
the basis that no further rights are sold by individual clubs.  (This was the subject of a 
competition law case described below.)  In France, the league itself ended this form of 
exclusivity despite explicit legislative protection. In Spain, clubs sell rights individually.  In Italy, 
the Parliament passed a regulation which prohibits a single broadcaster from controlling more 
than 70% of live matches, and the Competition Authority prohibited collective selling by the 
                     
12 TV Sports Markets Jan 15, 1999 pp 11-12. 
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League of live matches.  In Germany, by contrast, the Parliament passed a law which 
specifically exempted its football league from anti-cartel legislation. 
 
Collective and exclusive agreements in Germany and the UK are still subject to the provisions 
of European competition law, and in 1999 the European Commission’s Competition 
Directorate was studying both agreements. 
 
In Europe there is a further specific form of regulation of the sale of rights to sporting events.  
Under European Union regulation, each member state is entitled to “list” certain sporting or 
cultural events that the Government believes are of national interest. The holders of rights to 
such events must first of all offer them to free-to-air broadcasters with universal coverage on 
fair and reasonable terms.  Once this requirement has been satisfied, additional rights may be 
sold to pay broadcasters.  In the UK, for example, the rights in question cover events such as 
the Olympic Games and Soccer World Cup, and the finals of soccer, rugby and tennis 
competitions.  Elsewhere in Europe, cultural events are ‘listed’. 
 
This procedure recognises the fact that sports programming is highly valued by viewers and 
may also be characterised by a relatively inelastic demand curve, with the consequence that 
greater revenues can be generated from it by charging directly for it rather than indirectly 
through the sale of advertising time (see Owen and Wildman, 1992’Listing’ is thus motivated 
by a desire to prevent such “siphoning” of programming.13 This advantage for consumers is, 
however, gained at the expense of rights holders, who complain that the quality of their sports 
suffers as a result of being deprived of the true value of the rights.   
 
5. COMPETITION ISSUES  
 
The sale of sports broadcast rights raise at least two related competition issues:  
                     
14  An FCC examination of siphoning in the US concluded that it was not occurring (FCC 1994).  
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(1) Do restrictive agreements among a league’s teams reflect a desire to increase the 
“competitive balance” of the league or are they simply a means to limit competition 
and reduce sports fans’ choices?  
(2) Is vertical integration between broadcasters and sports leagues detrimental?  
Sports leagues as cartels 
The argument that a sports league is not a cartel relies upon special features of the 
relationships among its members.  In most industries, a firm would benefit from eliminating or 
weakening its competitors.  However, a member of a sports league clearly requires the 
participation of its competitors to make the competition possible, and, given the evidence that 
spectators are attracted by competitive balance within a league,14, it is not in any team’s long 
term interest  unduly to weaken its competitors.  Moreover, interest in any league match is 
based in part upon interest in the competition as a whole.  According to this view of the matter, 
the combination of competitive and co-operative arrangements  distinguishes members of a 
sports league from the members an industrial cartel.   
 
However, it is possible to separate the various activities undertaken by a sports league and its 
members into those which have to be undertaken collectively to maintain a viable league and 
those which should be  undertaken independently by league members so as to allow the public 
to benefit from competition.15  Agreement on a set of rules and a centrally coordinated 
calendar of match dates clearly come into the first category.  However, other activities, 
including the sale of match tickets, are undertaken by clubs individually.  Because the sale of 
broadcast rights falls into the category of activities that each club could undertake separately 
without harm to the league’s ability to offer competitive matches, it is more  natural to regard a 
joint decision by the clubs to restrict output as the operation of a cartel, although the cartel may 
seek to justify the restriction on public interest grounds. 
 
                     
14 Because uncertainty of the results of any match, or of the competition as a whole, generates spectator interest. 
 
15 A possible analogy is the approach taken in competition law to collaboration among firms in pre -competitive R & D, which may be 
justified, but is followed by competition in production and selling. 
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One argument in favour of a league restriction  on the number of  broadcast matches is that it 
enables clubs to avoid diversion of spectators from live games.  This can be viewed as action 
taken by the league to protect another revenue stream.  In any case, the evidence on the extent 
of diversion at current levels of televised matches of Premier League matches in the UK is 
inconclusive.  Tickets to many games are subject to such excess demand that grounds would 
remain full even if some matches were concurrently televised. (Kuypers 1996) 
 
One of the justifications for league-wide contracts rather than individual-team sales of 
broadcast rights is that the former provide support to the teams in smaller, less lucrative 
markets through more or less equal distribution of broadcast revenues. But this does nothing 
about imbalances in live gates and other forms of revenues. 
 
In any case, Fort and Quirk (1995) have shown that national league-wide contracts do nothing 
to alter the competitive balance in a league because they do not affect the teams’ marginal 
value of talent. Imbalance occurs when one team – presumably the team in the larger market -- 
 has a higher marginal value of talent when the talent is equally distributed across teams. As a 
result, the team from the larger market bids away talent from the others until marginal values of 
talent are equated – a position attained only when the large market team has more than its 
proportional share of the talent pool. Since the sharing of national broadcast revenues does 
not reflect talent shares and, therefore, win-lose percentages, such sharing does not affect the 
league’s competitive balance. This result is not unwelcome to the league that shares 
broadcast revenues because it is likely to benefit from the maintenance of the competitive 
imbalance that favors large-market teams.  
 
As Fort and Quirk point out, national broadcast revenues are greater when large-market teams 
reach the league championship series because more viewers are interested in the result. 
Broadcast-revenue sharing implicitly involves a transfer from more successful to less 
successful teams, but it may nevertheless appeal to the more successful teams.  First, if the 
national contract reduces competition among teams in the sale of broadcast rights, it may 
increase total broadcast revenues sufficiently to offset the successful team’s reduced share of 
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revenues. Second, a national contract may keep marginal teams in business, thereby 
foreclosing an entry opportunity for a second or third league. Thus national contracts may be a 
form of industry entry barrier. 
 
The U.K. 
 
In a recent case before the UK Restrictive Trade Practices Court, the Director General of Fair 
Trading argued that the clubs in the Premier League were in effect behaving like a cartel 
through their decision to sell live broadcast rights to a limited number of their matches (60 out 
of 380) to a single broadcaster, on the basis that the remaining matches would be not 
available for broadcast. In his argument before the Court, the Director General made it plain 
that he had no objection per se to collective sale of matches by the Premier League.  Indeed 
he suggested that two or more packages of rights could be sold to separate broadcasters, 
each granting exclusivity over the matches in question, provided thatthis was supplemented by 
giving the clubs the right to sell further matches on an individual basis.  In the Director 
General’s view, this would combine the benefits of giving certain broadcasters a guaranteed 
package of rights with the availability of further matches for sale to other broadcasters.16  
Premier League rights from 2001 are likely to be sold through multiple packages, possibly with 
limited opportunities for clubs to sell individual matches for delayed broadcasting. 
 
The United States 
 
In the US, the Sports Broadcast  Act  opened the door for restrictive, league-wide offerings of 
broadcasts, but it did not foreclose the option of independent team licensing of some games. 
The only league that relies solely on national network telecasts of its games is the National 
Football League. At first, these games were played almost entirely on Sunday afternoons. 
Thus, the NFL contract would limit choices only during autumn Sundays. Teams could not 
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independently license the broadcasts of their home games to local, regional, or other national 
broadcasters. As the number of networks expanded, the NFL extended its contracts to three 
and then four networks by broadcasting games on Monday and Thursday nights. Finally, the 
NFL offered all of its Sunday games to the DTH service, DirecTV. As a result, viewers may 
now obtain virtually any game from any viewing location on a Sunday afternoon. All NFL 
broadcast revenues divided evenly among the teams. 
 
Other U.S. leagues employ a mixture of national broadcasts, negotiated by the league, and a 
mix of  local and regional broadcasts, negotiated by each team. The result is a less equal 
distribution of broadcast income and a greater potential for disputes due to overlapping 
regional broadcasts. The most intense of these disputes involve off-air “superstation”  
broadcasts, broadcasts by local stations which are retransmitted nationally by satellite.  
 
Ultimately, these superstation broadcasts, involving principally New York, Atlanta, and Chicago 
basketball, baseball, and hockey teams, are limited through negotiations between the league 
and the stations’’’ home teams. The optimal number and mix of broadcasts is difficult to model 
because no one has ascertained the effect of different broadcast output levels on the 
competitive balance within leagues or the viewer intensity of demand for sports broadcasts of 
different teams. As a result, no one knows whether the current mix of  broadcasts by local off-
air stations, off-air networks, regional cable networks, national cable networks, and DTH 
services is optimal. 
 
Nevertheless, the recent U.S. experience with telecasts of college football is suggestive of the 
problems with league-wide contracts. Prior to 1984, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) negotiated a single national contract for televising football games of 
major U.S. universities. When two universities attempted to break away from this arrangement 
and negotiate their own contracts, they were sued by the NCAA. The NCAA lost the suit,17 
                                                             
16 The Court found that the clubs were not acting as a cartel, and that the form of collective sale employed was not unlawful 
(Judgment 1999). 
17  National Collegiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma et al, 468 U.S. 
85 (1984). 
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thereby freeing all member universities to negotiate their own television contracts. The result 
was a sharp increase in the number of games telecast, a large decline in the value of the 
television contracts per game, and an increase in competitive balance in college football.18 
 
It is unlikely that current television contracts in most U.S. professional leagues involve an 
important restriction of output. In the first place, most teams now offer a large number of their 
games through regional cable networks, local broadcast stations, or a combination of the two. 
Second, major “superstations” export large number of games for the teams from the larger 
markets to the entire country. Finally, the new broadcast satellites services, particularly 
DirecTV, offer large packages of games for every major professional sport. A viewer may 
purchase packages that allows him or her to view virtually any game being played on a given 
day or night. Thus, in practice, any viewer has access to virtually every major professional 
sports event in the country, constrained only by occasional invocations of league “black-out” 
rules.  
 
Were there greater competition among leagues, the prices of these now ubiquitous U.S. 
telecasts might be lower, but the output of televised sports events would probably not be much 
greater. National broadcast networks already offer as many as 600 hours per year of sports 
programming. DirecTV offers as many as 40 professional basketball games per week, 30 
professional hockey games per week, and 16 professional football games per week over its 
national footprint.    
 
Vertical Integration Between Broadcasters and Sports Clubs 
 
There is a theoretical basis for concluding that vertical integration between broadcasters and 
sports teams could result in a lessening of competition in the market for sports broadcast 
rights. The argument that broadcaster ownership of a sports league may be anti-competitive 
relies in part upon the so called toe-hold effect (Bulow et al 1999). A firm bidding for a 
                     
18 Quirk and Fort (1997); Bennett and Fizel (1995).  
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common value object of which it is already partial owner, will find that its net outlay on purchase 
will be reduced correspondingly, in relation to the highest unsuccessful bid.  This interacts with 
the ‘winner’s curse’, causing other bidders without a toe hold rationally to reduce their bids for 
fear that they have over bid in a contest with a competitor which already has an advantage. 
The operation of this mechanism will thus give a vertically integrated bidder an advantage to 
the detriment of the owner of the object.  This advantage could, however, be substantially 
reduced by adopting an auction procedure, such as sealed bid tendering, in which the 
‘winner’s curse’ plays a less important role.   
 
 
The U.S. 
 
Media ownership of sports teams is quite limited in the U.S. Indeed, one of the most important 
early examples of such ownership, the CBS purchase of the New York Yankees baseball club 
for $14 million in 1964, resulted in large losses and an eventual sale at a $4 million loss nine 
years later. 
 
The most important  media companies with major professional sports investments are News 
Corp, Disney, Time-Warner, Comcast, and Cablevision. The Time Warner investments 
occurred as the result of Time-Warner’s purchase of Turner Broadcasting; Ted Turner had 
owned most of the major sports teams in Atlanta. News Corp recently purchased the Los 
Angeles Dodgers and options to purchase interests in the Los Angeles Lakers basketball 
team and the Los Angeles Kings hockey team. Cablevision and Comcast own several sports 
teams in New York and Philadelphia, respectively. (See Table 8.) 
 
Vertical integration between broadcast media and sports teams is so limited, that its effect 
on the supply of games broadcast is simply not an issue in the United States. There is 
simply no evidence on the degree to which broadcasters in New York, Philadelphia, 
Atlanta, and Los Angeles have used their ownership of sports teams to gain an advantage 
in bidding for national broadcast rights. Nor is there any evidence that this ownership has 
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led to reduction of the amount of programming available in the teams’ own geographical 
market. Since some of these ownership positions for a considerable period of time, 
particularly in New York and Atlanta, there has been ample time to study such effects, but 
we are not aware of any attempt to do so. 
 
Europe 
 
In Europe, there are a limited number of examples of broadcast firms owning sports clubs, 
especially soccer clubs.  The most prominent are the ownership of AC Milan by Mediaset and 
of Paris St. Germain by Canal Plus. Some restraint on broadcasters’ ownership of football 
clubs is exercised by national and European football association rules, which prevent a single 
firm from having a controlling stake in two or more clubs playing in the same competition. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Media Ownership of U.S. Sports Teams, 1999 
 
 
Media Company 
 
U.S. Ownership Interests 
 
Comcast Corp.  
 
Philadelphia 76ers (NBA); Philadelphia Flyers 
(NHL); Philadelphia Phantoms (WBA) 
 
News Corp (Fox)  
 
Los Angeles Dodgers (MLB);  
options to purchase share of Los Angeles 
Lakers (NBA) and Los Angeles Kings (NHL)  
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Walt Disney Co. Anaheim Angels (MLB); Mighty Ducks of 
Anaheim (NHL) 
 
Cablevision Systems 
 
New York Knicks (NBA); New York Rangers 
(NHL); New York Liberty (WBA) 
 
Time Warner, Inc. 
 
Atlanta Braves (MLB); Atlanta Hawks (NBA; 
Atlanta Thrashers (NHL) 
  Source: Kagan (1998) 
 
 
The recent attempted take-over in the UK of Manchester United, the largest and most 
successful football club, by BSkyB, the monopoly supplier of premium sports programming, 
was blocked in 1999 following an enquiry by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The 
parties to the proposed merger argued that, whatever position BSkyB occupied in the 
broadcast market, Manchester United was one of twenty Premier League clubs, with, under 
current arrangements for the collective sale of broadcast rights, no power of independent 
action over the pricing of its rights.  A vertical merger in which one party exercised no market 
power would have little incremental impact on competition in either broadcasting or soccer. 
 
The conclusion thus hinged upon questions of market definition: if the broadcast market were 
broadly defined, to include free-to-air and both basic and pay television, for example, then the 
acquisition by any broadcaster of a particular set of sports rights would do little to enhance its 
market power; but if premium pay TV, or premium sports channels represented a separate 
market, that would be a different matter especially if dominance in that market could be 
leveraged more widely.   
 
There are difficulties in applying the standard procedures for market definition in application to 
broadcast markets.  Examining the impact of relative price changes is bedeviled by the fact 
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that free-to-air television is by definition available at zero financial cost.  At the same time, the 
quality of pay television offerings is likely to vary over time as a result of increases in the 
number of channels in basic packages and changes in the programming in premium channels. 
 
European competition authorities have addressed this question on several occasions.  In 
1996, the OFT concluded that the relevant market for the supply of programming at the 
wholesale level was pay TV in the UK, and that the pay TV market could be further sub-divided 
into distinct and separable markets for premium sports and movie channels (OFT, 1996).  The 
European Commission’s Services have argued that the market seems to be evolving in such a 
way that it will be no longer possible to define it as for sports programmes in general, but for 
some specific sports, for example for football or for Formula 1 motor racing (EC, 1998 p.21).  
In the Premier League case, the Director General of Fair Trading argued that, in the sale of 
live rights, the economic market was either Premier League matches, or Premier League 
matches supplemented by other televised matches involving Premier League clubs.19  In the 
MMC report, the same conclusion was buttressed by:  
 
i) The higher prices per match paid at wholesale level for Premier League matches 
than for other football matches. 
ii) The higher audience figures for Premier League matches or matches involving 
Premier League teams than for other football matches. 
iii) Surveys of pay TV subscribers which suggested that the Premier League and the 
F.A. Cup were regarded by respondents as the most important football 
competitions on Sky Sport.  (MMC (1999) paras 4.123 – 136.)  
  
At the retail level, the MMC  concluded that the relevant market is for pay TV sports premium 
channels. (Ibid) Paras 4.53 – 121).  This analysis underlay the Commission’s further 
conclusion that a higher barrier to entry into premium sports channels would cause the prices 
                     
 
21 The Court did not accept this argument, noting inter alia that the legislation required it to approach market definition in a 
different way from that conventionally employed by competition authorities. (Judgment 1999) 
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for BSkyB’s sports channels to be higher than would otherwise be the case.  Reduced entry 
into the sports premium channel market would feed through in to reduced competition in the 
wider pay TV market. (MMC 1999, para. 2.225). The Commission  concluded that a vertically 
integrated broadcaster would have an advantage in the process, if not from the toe hold effect 
then from better information about the progress of events. (MMC 1999, para. 2.106 – 117).  
This consideration seems to have played a part, if a limited one, in the Commission’s decision 
to recommend that integration should not be permitted. 20 
 
 
It is notable that similar concerns have not been expressed in the United States. The U.S. has 
one of the most vibrantly competitive video distribution markets in the world. T here are now at 
least six national or quasi-national off-air networks and more than 125 cable networks, 
approximately 30 regional sports cable networks, as well as two rapidly-growing DTH systems 
that provide their own sports packages. Several of the national cable networks, such as TNT 
and USA, provide substantial sports programming while ESPN offers three networks 
exclusively devoted to sports. 
 
There is simply no evidence that entry into the video distribution market has been constrained 
by the absence of sports license agreements from major sports leagues. Indeed, DirecTV’s 
ability to obtain rights to all of the major sports leagues’’’ games suggests that these leagues 
fear antitrust prosecution, federal regulation, or the threat of entry by new leagues if they deny 
new distribution media their broadcast rights.    
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
It is clear from the foregoing that there are significant differences between the United 
States and the major European countries, both in the organisation of sporting events 
which generate sports rights, and in the organisation of the retail market for sports 
                     
20  Since the prohibition of the take-over of Manchester United, BSkyB and two other UK broadcasters have 
brought stakes of less than 10% in eight Premier League Clubs.  These have the same ‘toe-hold’ effects. 
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programming. In particular: 
 
1. In the United States, interest in sports on the part of the public, either as spectators 
at sporting events or as viewers of sports broadcasts, is much more balanced  
across sports than in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK where soccer plays 
a pre-eminent role.; 
 
2. In the United States, the broadcast market, especially the pay-broadcast market, 
has not exhibited the dominance by one or a small number of firms which has 
characterised the development of pay-broadcasting in the major European 
countries. 
 
Each of these points reflects in part the much larger size of the market in the United States.  
We have argued above that in Europe a combination of skewed consumer tastes for soccer 
and of limited opportunities for entry into the broadcasting market on the back of other sports 
has created a situation in which rights holders can, through collective selling, exploit a 
dominant or monopoly position in the rights markets and – if they choose to – can leverage 
that market power in broadcasting. 
 
The problem is exacerbated by significant political influence wielded both in the upstream 
market where the sports rights are generated and in the down stream market where sports 
and other rights are packaged and sold by broadcasters.  In the former case, this is 
demonstrated by the success of legislation in both the United States and Germany which has 
exempted sporting organisations from certain provisions of national competition law. In the 
latter case, governments are often reluctant to antagonise broadcasters who may wield 
significant political influence.   
 
Concentration of ownership of sports rights thus can become the source of significant 
competition problems.  US and European experience suggests that collective sale of rights by 
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a sports body is not inherently objectionable, but only becomes so when combined with 
exclusivity – the sale of a limited number of matches to a single broadcaster, and further sale 
being prohibited. 
 
In the US, the professional sports league that sells all of its matches to national broadcasters, 
the NFL, hasdemonstrated a preference for doing so to a variety of competing broadcasters.  
In several European countries, a collective contract does not prevent clubs from selling 
individual matches to other broadcasters.  The English and German soccer leagues, by 
contrast, have sold through collective and exclusive contracts which run the risk of leveraging 
dominant positions in pay broadcasting.  Such deals are likely to be anti-competitive and 
against the public interest in almost all circumstances, when they apply to leagues dominant in 
their markets. 
 
European experience suggests that, because of the strength of vested interests, competition 
authorities are the only bodies likely to be prepared to intervene to protect consumers of 
broadcast services. For this reason, their vigilance in the scrutiny of collective selling 
agreements is clearly warranted.  In order to carry out this function, they need to devote 
considerable attention to market definition at wholesale and retail levels, and to have a full 
understanding of the complexities of the broadcasting market, arising from the co-existence of 
services financed in quite different ways. 
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